Reference study · under Publications
The map of research centers on Syria
Before deciding where we stand, we studied who stands around us: fourteen Syrian, regional and international centers, each with its own file. This is the summary — every figure carries its source and date in the full report (forthcoming).
| Center | Founded and based | Its real strength | Its structural gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| Omran Center for Strategic Studies | 2013 · Turkey/Damascus | The deepest specialization in governance and local administration among the Syrian centers studied; about 25 researchers; a memorandum with Damascus University | Does not measure; funding undisclosed |
| Jusoor for Studies | 2016 · Istanbul/London | The fastest tempo among the Syrian centers studied, with its “situation assessment” product; a religious-movements unit | A small team; funding undisclosed; no wide survey |
| Arab Center for Contemporary Syrian Studies (formerly Harmoon) | 2016 · Doha/Damascus | A substantial research network; monthly monitoring reports; a comprehensive annual conference | Single-source funding; no polling of its own |
| Syrian Center for Policy Research | 2011 · Damascus until 2016, then Vienna | The most rigorous methodological model among the Syrian centers studied: the 2016 casualties report, the price index and poverty lines | Left the field in 2016; intermittent output |
| IDRAK for Studies and Consultations | 2014 · Aleppo | Independent survey studies and a media presence | No wide national survey; irregular output |
| MISDAD - Syrian Center for Security and Defense Studies | 2025 · registered inside Syria | The only Syrian center specialised in security and defense; a unique open-source-investigation line (flight tracking, satellite imagery, digital verification); near-weekly tempo from its first year; a fully named advisory board | Does not measure or poll; funding is “private Syrian donations” with no figures or names |
| National Institute of Public Administration | 2002 · Damascus | The official body for training and advising state cadres | No public-opinion measurement |
| Syria in Transition (poll) | 2025 · supported by the Clingendael Institute | Periodic waves with a transparent methodology, 900 respondents | Not nationally representative; three governorates |
| Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (Arab Opinion Index) | 2010 · Doha | The largest published periodic Arab opinion poll: 40,130 respondents in 15 countries; and the first wave with published methodology inside Syria (2025) | No published budget figure; irregular Syrian coverage |
| SETA (Turkey) | 2006 · Ankara | A peer-reviewed journal; five offices; a broad presence in Turkey’s public debate | No barometer of its own; does not publish funding sources |
| RAND | 1948 · Santa Monica | The benchmark for methodologies: Delphi, decision games, analysis under uncertainty; a $514 million budget | Client concentration in a single sector |
| Brookings | 1916 · Washington | A $538 million endowment; has disclosed its donors since 1983 | Funding and reputation crises despite transparency |
| Chatham House | 1920 · London | The closed-dialogue rule; 6,000 members; more than 300 events a year | High-fee membership |
| Heritage | 1973 · Washington | Began with nine staff; the “briefcase test”; the “Mandate for Leadership” | Ideologically partisan by its own declaration |
The assessment rests on official websites, think-tank directories and annual reports. Funding figures for most Syrian centers are not officially published, so we refrained from estimating them.
The methodological gap we aspire to fill
Most of those who analyse do not measure
Omran, Jusoor and the Arab Center for Contemporary Syrian Studies: substantial analysis of governance, situation and monitoring — but no nationally representative poll of their own; the analysis stands on other people’s numbers, or on none.
And most of those who measure do not analyse in depth
The Arab Opinion Index, the Syrian Center for Policy Research and Syria in Transition own the instruments — but a single wave, or intermittent output since leaving the field, or a sample that is not nationally representative; no regular time series and no statistical analysis tied to policy.
Combining the two is still open
Nationally representative fieldwork across the fourteen governorates and deep statistical analysis that ties the number to policy, in a quarterly series with a published methodology produced from inside Syria — and there is a pressing need for someone to do it. The first national opinion poll inside Syria with a published methodology was produced by a center outside it (Arab Opinion Index, 2025). That is our place.